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Abstract
We develop a model of a small open economy with credit market frictions to
analyze the consequences of capital account liberalization. We show that finan-
cial opening facilitates the inflows of cheap foreign funds and improves production
efficiency. Reforms increasing labor market flexibility can further improve such
efficiency gains. However, capital account liberalization also has important distri-
butional consequences. Specifically, it may be impossible to use public transfers to
fully compensate the loss of those negatively affected by capital account liberaliza-
tion. This explains why financial opening often meets fierce opposition even though
it leads to efficiency gains for the economy as a whole. From a practical perspective,
capital controls should be lifted gradually for a smooth transition.
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1 Introduction
We address three related questions concerning capital account liberalization in a small-
open-economy model with financial frictions. How does capital account liberalization
affect production efficiency? Who benefits from capital account liberalization in the long
run and in the short run? How should capital account liberalization be implemented?
International capital flows provide developing economies with the means to exploit
promising investment opportunities; at the same time, international investors are able
to earn higher returns as well as to reduce risk via international portfolio diversification.
Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-I-Martin (1995) analyze capital mobility in neoclassical growth
models in which the economy can borrow to finance only a portion of its capital and human
capital must be finance by domestic savings. Their open-economy model conforms to the
empirical evidence on convergence. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) investigate
the dynamic interactions between domestic and international collateral constraints and
show that limited financial development reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter
emerging markets. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006) analyze the effects of different
structural shocks on global capital flows, portfolio shares and interest rates. Using the
representative-agent model, these papers do not compare asset allocation and production
efficiency under financial opening and financial autarky. As one of the few exceptions,
Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) show that capital account liberalization facilitates
the inflow of cheap foreign funds and improve production efficiency.
During the past two decades, many countries have deregulated financial markets and
lifted capital controls. Global capital flows have achieved record highs relative to global
income. Francisco (2005) and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) show theoretically
that capital account liberalization makes different agents strictly better off in the case of
capital inflows. However, Das and Mohapatra (2003) analyze the dynamics of the shifts
in income distributions in a sample of 11 countries that undertook extensive economic
reforms between 1986 and 1995; they show a positive coefficient between liberalization
and the highest income quintile’s share of mean income, and a negative coefficient between
liberalization and the middle class income share. In other words, liberalization policy has
opposite welfare effects to different individuals. There is discrepancy between theoretical
prediction and empirical evidence on the welfare effects of capital account liberalization.
In addition, efficiency gains from capital account liberalization may also depend on
other market institutions, e.g., the labor market. Davis (1998) analyzes how free trade
between a flexible-wage America and a rigid-wage Europe can affect European unem-
ployment. Acemoglu (2001) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) analyze how credit market
imperfections can influence unemployment and aggregate economic activity. However,
there may be repercussion from labor market to credit and goods market in the sense
that the labor market flexibility may influence the output effect of capital account liber-
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alization. Therefore, the coordination of liberalization in credit market and labor market
should be taken into consideration. This point has not yet been made explicitly in the
current literature on capital account liberalization.
The proper sequencing and implementation are of great importance for the overall suc-
cess of capital account liberalization. According to Bakker and Chapple (2002), United
Kingdom lifted its capital controls in a cold-turkey manner in 1981 and an asset price
bubble developed toward the end of the 1980s; similarly, Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden also undertook rapid capital account liberalization during 1980s and
there was also asset price boom. When growth eventually slowed, loan losses mounted
rapidly in Norway, Finland, Sweden, leading to banking crises. Bacchetta and van Win-
coop (1998) and Iacoviello (2002) provide empirical evidences on financial liberalization
and asset price overshooting in emerging markets and west European countries. Edwards
(2007) collects a broad range of country-specific studies on capital controls and capital
account liberalization, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea. The short-run asset price booms lead to lending booms and then huge amount
of non-performing loans ex post before the economy suffers from sudden stops and cur-
rent account reversals, as widely observed in the financial crises in East Asian and South
America in 1990s. Such empirical facts have not yet been explained in theoretical models.
Our contribution to the literature is three-folded. Similar as Aoki, Benigno, and Kiy-
otaki (2006), we show that capital account liberalization improves production efficiency.
As our first result, we show that due to endogenous asset reallocation, the more produc-
tive agents benefit while the less productive agents lose from capital account liberalization
in our model economy. Furthermore, it may be impossible to use public transfers to fully
compensate the loss of those negatively affected by capital account liberalization. Our
prediction on the relationship between capital account liberalization and inequality is in
line with the empirical evidence of Das and Mohapatra (2003). It explains why finan-
cial opening often meets fierce opposition even though it leads to efficiency gains for the
economy as a whole. In this sense, capital account liberalization is desirable from the
efficiency perspective but not from the welfare perspective.
Second, efficiency gains from capital account liberalization are larger in the model
economy with more flexible labor market. Thus, from the efficiency perspective, reforms
increasing labor market flexibility should accompany capital account liberalization.
Third, due to financial frictions, asset prices overshoot and there are large macroe-
conomic fluctuations in our model economy if capital controls are lifted in a cold-turkey
fashion. It is consistent with the empirical findings of Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998)
and Iacoviello (2002). From the practical perspective, capital controls should be lifted
gradually for a smooth transition.
The intuitions behind our results can be briefly shown as follows. Consider a small
open economy with two types of domestic agents: households and entrepreneurs. Both
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have projects to produce intermediate goods using a durable physical asset, e.g., land.
The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is expected to be more produc-
tive than the household project. As households are risk averse and the entrepreneurs’
project is subject to idiosyncratic risk, mutual funds emerge as financial intermediaries
in equilibrium: they collect deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. Due to
unobservable project choice a` la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), entrepreneurs cannot fully
pledge the project outcomes for loans. As a result, some of the land stock is inefficiently
allocated to households. Given that land has a fixed total supply, production efficiency
can be measured by the entrepreneurs’ fraction of the total land stock. Domestic agents
are endowed with labor. Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor.
Foreign lenders are risk neutral and supply funds at a constant interest rate lower
than the domestic rate. Foreign lenders are less informed of the domestic projects and
less familiar with the domestic market institutions than the mutual funds. Thus, they
do not lend directly to domestic individuals but make deposits at the mutual funds. In
consideration of financial security and financial stability, the public regulator controls
capital flows.1 We model capital controls as the upper limit on the foreign fraction of
total deposits at the mutual funds. Thus, capital account liberalization is the process in
which the public regulator raises the limit permanently.
Capital account liberalization enables mutual funds to get more foreign deposits at a
lower interest rate. As the weighted average of the domestic and foreign deposit rates,
the domestic loan rate declines when capital controls are lifted. Although entrepreneurs
cannot borrow directly abroad, they benefit from the decline in the loan rate. More land
is allocated towards entrepreneurs and production becomes more efficient.
Our first result says that the more productive agents (entrepreneurs) benefit strictly
from the favorable asset reallocation; while, due to the substitution of foreign deposits
for domestic deposits and the unfavorable asset reallocation, the less productive agents
(households) lose in the long run. Intuitively, capital account liberalization entitles foreign
depositors to get an net interest payment. If the foreign interest rate is not too small, the
net interest paid to foreign lenders may exceed the efficiency gains from capital account
liberalization. In other words, although aggregate output of the economy increases due
to capital account liberalization, final goods available for domestic consumption may
decrease. Given that entrepreneurs benefit strictly from asset reallocation, households are
strictly worse off than under international financial autarky. In order to compensate the
loss of households, the public regulator may consider a transfer to households financed
by the wealth tax on entrepreneurs. However, the wealth tax reduces the borrowing
capacity of entrepreneurs ex ante and worsens production efficiency. Given that the tax
on entrepreneurs does not make them worse off than under financial autarky, public
transfers cannot fully compensate the loss of households. This result holds in our model
1Neely (1999) gives an introduction to the purposes and types of capital controls.
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as long as the net foreign interest rate is slightly positive.
Our second result says that efficiency gains are larger if labor supply is more flexi-
ble. On the one hand, capital account liberalization has the negative effect on household
wealth. On the other hand, the reallocation of land towards entrepreneurs raises ag-
gregate output of intermediate goods. Given the complementarity between labor and
intermediate goods in the final goods production, the household wage rate rises. Thus,
the negative wealth effect and the positive wage effect of capital account liberalization
induce households to increase their labor supply. At the same time, the rise in the house-
hold labor supply pushes up the price of intermediate goods and the external value of
the entrepreneurs’ projects increases, too. Thus, entrepreneurs can acquire more loans
and invest more land in their projects. In this sense, capital account liberalization has
an indirect positive output effect via the channel of the household labor supply. In coun-
tries with more flexible labor market, the increase in the household labor supply is larger
and so are efficiency gains. Therefore, from the efficiency perspective, capital account
liberalization should be accompanied with reforms increasing labor market flexibility.
The public regulator can lift capital controls either in the cold-turkey approach or in
the gradualism approach. The former refers to an announcement of an immediate increase
in the limit, while the latter refers to an announcement of a policy path for the limit
gradually reaching the new level over time. If capital controls are lifted in the cold-turkey
approach, the dramatic increase in the inflows of cheap foreign capital reduces the domestic
loan rate and entrepreneurs can expand their borrowing and investment significantly. Due
to financial frictions, the land price overshoots and economic fluctuations are large. Our
third result says that from a practical perspective, capital account should be liberalized
gradually to avoid asset price overshooting and its undesired consequences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
discusses the long-run efficiency and welfare implications of capital account liberalization.
Section 4 analyzes the transitional dynamics of capital account liberalization under two
implementation approaches. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a small, open, real economy with infinite time horizon. There are a continuum
of foreign lenders, a public regulator, and two types of domestic agents: households and
entrepreneurs, each of unit mass. A durable domestic asset (land) has a fixed total supply,
K. There are two perishable goods: an intermediate good, a final good. Intermediate
goods are only used for domestic production and not subject to foreign trade, while final
goods can be consumed, invested, or traded. We choose the final good as the numeraire.
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They have a safe backyard project to
produce intermediate goods using land as the only input. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral
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and each has a constant probability of survival, pi. In each period, entrepreneurs of mass
(1−pi) die and new entrepreneurs of the same mass are born, keeping the population size of
entrepreneurs constant at unity. Each entrepreneur has two available projects to produce
intermediate goods using both land and final goods as inputs. Projects are subject to
idiosyncratic risk: they have positive output in the case of success and there is no output in
the case of failure. Each entrepreneur can choose only one project and his project choice is
unobservable to others. It takes one period for households and entrepreneurs to complete
their projects. Land does not depreciate, while the final goods invested fully depreciates
in production. Households and entrepreneurs have labor endowment each period. Final
goods are produced using intermediate goods and labor contemporaneously.
The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is expected to be more productive
than that of households. As households are risk averse and the entrepreneurs’ project is
subject to idiosyncratic risk, mutual funds emerge as financial intermediaries. They collect
deposits from households and rdt denotes the gross deposit rate. Given the time length
of the entrepreneurs’ project, mutual funds give one-period loans to entrepreneurs and rt
denotes the gross loan rate.2 Following Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006), we assume
that foreign lenders supply funds at a constant interest rate lower than the domestic loan
rate, r∗ < rt. The public regulator controls capital flows and makes lump-sum transfer to
households financed by taxing entrepreneurs.
Land is traded at the spot market. Let vt, qt, wt, and w
e
t denote the prices of interme-
diate goods and land, and the wage rates of households and entrepreneurs, respectively.
2.1 International Capital Flows
The mutual funds have the exclusive technology to perfectly verify the project outcomes of
domestic agents and liquidate at no discount the land stock of domestic agents in default.
Given the interest rate differential, rt > r
∗, domestic agents prefer to borrow abroad for
the cheap foreign funds. However, as foreign lenders are uninformed of domestic projects
and unfamiliar with domestic asset market, they prefer to make deposits at the mutual
funds instead of lend directly to domestic agents.
2.1.1 Capital Controls
Financial stability and financial security are among the arguments for capital controls in
many developing economies.3 Let Zt denote aggregate loans provided by mutual funds.
2The domestic deposit rate rdt and the loan rate rt are same under international financial autarky;
otherwise, they are different. See subsection 2.4 for details.
3We analyze the implications of capital account liberalization instead of why capital controls exist and
why capital account liberalization happens. Capital account liberalization may result from domestic and
foreign pressures. It is not a day-to-day business but an unexpected regime change. Eichengreen (2001)
surveys the literature on the usage of capital controls and the motives of capital account liberalization.
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The public regulator allows mutual funds to finance their domestic loans using foreign
funds without exceeding the upper limits of z∗t = θtZt, where θt ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
degree of capital controls. The mutual funds finance the rest of their domestic loans using
domestic deposits, dt = (1−θt)Zt. The break even condition of mutual funds implies that
the loan rate rt is the weighted average of the domestic and foreign deposit rates,
rtZt = r
∗θtZt + rdt (1− θt)Zt, or rt = r∗θt + rdt (1− θt). (1)
Given r∗t < r
d
t in the neighborhood of the steady state, the loan rate is between the
domestic and foreign interest rates and declines in θ ∈ (0, 1).
2.1.2 Capital Account Liberalization
In order to analyze how capital account liberalization can affect production efficiency,
social welfare, and macroeconomic fluctuations, we simply assume that the public regu-
lator has full control over θt. For the long-run analysis of capital account liberalization,
we investigate the steady state features of production efficiency and social welfare under
various degrees of capital controls in section 3.
For the short-run dynamics, we model capital account liberalization as the process in
which θt keeps constant and the economy is in its initial steady state before the public
regulator announces an increase in θt at the beginning of period 0. Normally, the liber-
alization policy is first announced before it is implemented so that domestic agents have
time to adapt to the new policy environment. In other words, θt does not jump in the
period of announcement. However, the public regulator still can choose to lift capital
controls either in the cold-turkey approach or in the gradualism approach. According
to the cold-turkey approach, the public regulator raises θ in period 1 immediately to the
new level. According to the gradualism approach, the public regulator announces a policy
path for θ gradually rising to its new level from period 1 on.
The two approaches can be modeled as the following process,
log θt = logGt − log Jt,
logGt = logGt−1 + εt,
log Jt = ρ log Jt−1 + εt,
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) determines the speed of θ reaching the new level. The one-time policy
change εt does not have immediate impact on θ in period 0, but θ rises to the new level
from period 1 on. See Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for the modeling approach. Figure
1 shows the time path of θ specified in the two approaches, given a 1% positive policy
change in period 0. A larger ρ implies that it takes longer for θ to reach the new level.
In section 4, we model the cold-turkey (gradualism) approach by setting ρ = 0 (ρ = 0.95)
and compare the transitional dynamics under the two approaches.
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Figure 1: The Policy Paths in Two Approaches
2.2 Households
Households have preference over consumption and leisure,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct) + χ
(L¯− lt)1−ψ − 1
1− ψ
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor; ct, L¯, and lt denote household con-
sumption, labor endowment, and labor supply in period t, respectively.
Given that kt−1 units of land were invested in the household project in period t − 1,
H(kt−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t and the
sales revenues amount to vtH(kt−1). Given that households deposited dt−1 units of final
goods at the mutual funds in period t − 1, their deposit return is rdt−1dt−1 in period t.
Their wage income is wtlt. Households get lump-sum transfers from the public regulator,
Λt, and the transfers of any profits or losses from mutual funds, Πt. At the end of period
t, households invest kt units of land in their projects, deposit dt at the mutual funds, and
consume ct. As the loan rate is smaller than the deposit rate, rt < r
d
t , households prefer
to borrow from the mutual funds and deposit at a higher rate. Due to debt enforcement
problem, they are subject to collateral constraints, i.e., their total liabilities cannot exceed
the collateral value of their land stock in period t+1. The household collateral constraints
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and flow-budget constraints are binding in equilibrium,
rtz
h
t = Etqt+1kt,
qt(kt − kt−1) + dt + ct + rt−1zht−1 = vtH(kt−1) + rdt−1dt−1 + zht + wtlt + Πt + Λt,
where zht denote the household land-backed loan from the mutual funds in period t. The
optimization over {ct, lt, dt, kt} gives the following equilibrium conditions,
c−1t wt = χ(L¯− lt)−ψ, (2)
1 = βrdtEt
(
ct+1
ct
)−1
, (3)
qt − Etqt+1
rt
= βEt
(
ct+1
ct
)−1
vt+1H
′(kt). (4)
Households deposit dt and borrow z
h
t against their land stock. Thus, their net deposits at
the mutual funds are dt−zht . Under international financial autarky, the loan rate coincides
with the deposit rate, rdt = rt. In this case, it does not matter whether they deposit dt
and borrow zht or they finance the project investment using own funds and then deposit
dt − zht at the mutual funds. Essentially, their deposits dt can be regarded as their gross
saving which consists of the saving in the form of land stock and the saving in the form
of lending to entrepreneurs via mutual funds. In the case of financial opening, households
take advantage of the interest rate differential between deposits and loans.
As shown in equation 4, households pay qt − Etqt+1rt units of final goods for a unit of
land invested in their project in period t. After repaying their liability in period t + 1,
households get the marginal return, vt+1H
′(kt).
In section 3, we analyze the long-run efficiency and welfare implications of capital
account liberalization. In order to explicitly show the efficiency gains due to asset real-
location, we first assume that households do not care about leisure, χ = 0. Thus, they
supply all their labor endowment to the production of final goods, lt = L¯, which is called
the case of the fixed household labor supply. Then, we set χ > 0 and show that how the
endogenous supply of household labor can reinforce the asset reallocation and enhance
efficiency gains. Equation 2 holds in the case of the endogenous household labor supply
but not in the case of the fixed household labor supply.4
2.3 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur can choose one of two projects: “Good” and “Bad”, and his project
choice is irreversible. Both projects have the same Leontief technology, i.e., a units of
4It is a little bit abuse of terminology. Even in the case of χ = 0, the household labor supply, lt = L¯,
is still endogenously determined.
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final goods are required for each unit of land invested.5 Projects produce R units of
intermediate goods per unit of the land invested in the case of succeeds; there is no
output in the case of failure. Projects provide entrepreneurs with safe, nonpecuniary
private benefits during the project process.6 For convenience of aggregation, we assume
that private benefits are proportional to the amount of land invested. Let (pG, 0) and
(pB, b) denote the success probability and private benefits per unit of land invested in the
two projects, respectively. The assumption of 0 < b and 0 < pB < pG < 1 implies that
project “Bad” is riskier but yields higher private benefits than project “Good”.
As each entrepreneur has a probability of death and the project invested is subject
to idiosyncratic risk, entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-period wealth. Due to the linear
nature of preference and technologies, the entrepreneurs’ project investment and loans
are proportional to their end-of-period wealth, as shown below. In other words, only the
first moment of their end-of-period wealth matters for the aggregate economic activities
in the entrepreneurial sector. Therefore, we focus only on the behavior of an “average”
entrepreneur instead of trace the economic decisions of each individual entrepreneur.7
The “average” entrepreneurs who stays in the economy to the next period has linear
preferences over consumption and private benefits,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βt
(
cet + Bket−1
)
,
where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {0, b} denotes private benefits per unit of
land invested in the two project. cet denotes his consumption in period t and k
e
t−1 denotes
his land stock invested in period t− 1.
Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net
present value around the steady state,
Et
pGRvt+1 + qt+1
rt
> qt + a > Et
pBRvt+1 + qt+1
rt
.
Therefore, only project “Good” should be financed in equilibrium. In addition, project
“Good” is expected to be always more productive than that of households,
Et[p
GRvt+1 + qt+1]
qt + a
>
Et[vt+1H
′(0) + qt+1]
qt
.
5In models with collateral constraints a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the leverage ratio of borrowers,
defined as the ratio of total investment over own funds, is equal to the inverse of the gross interest rate,
which is too high and cannot be justified by the empirical data. We introduce the input of domestic final
goods to reduce the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs to the reasonable level, e.g., 2.
6According to Hart (1995), private benefits may refer to any nonpecuniary benefits from running a
project, e.g., large offices or luxury business cars. Private benefits are good for the project owners but
may reduce the success probability of projects. The trade-off between the success probability and private
benefits is a short-cut to capture divergent objectives between project owners and outside financiers. Our
set-up resembles the principal-agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
7See von Hagen and Zhang (2006) and von Hagen and Zhang (2007) for detailed description.
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The entrepreneur invests ket units of land and ak
e
t units of final goods into either
project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds, nt, and loans from mutual funds,
zet . Thus, nt = (qt+a)k
e
t −zet is his net worth in the project. As shown in Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997), the contract between the entrepreneur and the mutual funds resembles the
standard loan contract. Be specific, the entrepreneur borrows zet units of final goods from
the mutual funds in period t; he promises to repay Rmt k
e
t units of final goods to mutual
funds in period t+ 1 if the project succeeds; if the project fails in period t+ 1, he simply
hands over his land stock to the mutual funds and is exempted from debt repayment.
As the mutual funds can perfectly verify the project outcomes, the entrepreneur always
repays the promised amount if he is able to do so. In addition, the public regulator taxes
entrepreneurs with successful projects in period t + 1. As entrepreneurs differ in their
wealth, it is impossible to levy lump-sum tax. We assume that tax is proportional to
the entrepreneurs’ project investment in the previous period, τket . In order to induce the
entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, the mutual funds must choose a proper Rmt and
give him enough incentives,{
pGEt[Rvt+1 + qt+1 −Rmt − τ ]
}
ket ≥
{
pBEt[Rvt+1 + qt+1 −Rmt − τ ] + b
}
ket .
The left (right) hand side denotes the entrepreneur’s expected utility if he chooses project
“Good” (“Bad”). As the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the loan
rate, the entrepreneur borrow to the limit. The incentive constraints are binding around
the steady state and can be simplified to,
Rmt = Et[Rvt+1 + qt+1]− b˜− τ, where b˜ ≡
b
pG − pB > 0. (5)
Each unit of land invested in project “Good” in period t has an expected after-tax value
of Et[p
G(Rvt+1 − τ) + qt+1] in period t + 1. Any promise to repay more than Rmt ket
to the mutual funds in the case of success is not credible. Thus, the entrepreneur can
pledge pGRmt + (1− pG)Etqt+1 per unit of land invested to the mutual funds in period t.
Et[p
G(Rvt+1− τ) + qt+1] and pGRmt + (1− pG)Etqt+1 are defined as the expected after-tax
full value and external value per unit of the land invested in project “Good”, respectively.
The difference between the two values, pGb˜, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose
project “Good” despite the lower private benefits it promises, 0 < b.
If the mutual funds could perfectly observe the project choice of entrepreneurs, en-
trepreneurs would choose project “Good” and pledge the project outcome to mutual funds
for loans; entrepreneurs would not have to put own funds in the project and would not
get any pecuniary reward. In this sense, it is unobservable project choice that makes
aggregate production inefficient. As project “Good” has a higher expected rate of return
than that of households, a simple shift of the land stock from households to entrepreneurs
increases aggregate output of intermediate goods. Thus, production efficiency is measured
here by the fraction of the entrepreneurs’ land stock over the aggregate land stock.
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The mutual funds are expected to break even in period t, rtz
e
t = [p
GRmt + (1 −
pG)Etqt+1]k
e
t . It implies a credit constraint for the entrepreneur,
zet = Γtnt, where Γt ≡
pG(REtvt+1−b˜−τ)+Etqt+1
rt
(qt + a)− pG(REtvt+1−b˜−τ)+Etqt+1rt
. (6)
Γt is the credit multiplier. As we are interested in the case where entrepreneurs finance
their projects using both own funds and external funds, we calibrate the model in such
a way that the denominator in the definition of Γt is positive around the steady state;
otherwise, entrepreneurs can finance their projects using external funds only. As Γt is
independent of nt, loans are proportional to the entrepreneur’s net worth and so are their
project investment, ket . Note that the credit multiplier is negatively related with the
wealth tax rate, τ . Intuitively, the ex post wealth tax reduces the ex ante pledgable value
of the entrepreneurs’ project in the case of success. Ceteris paribus, the entrepreneur’ ex
ante borrowing capacity is reduced and so is their land stock in period t. In this sense,
the wealth tax on entrepreneurs has a negative effect on production efficiency.
Suppose that entrepreneurs finance their project investment using own funds and loans
in period t − 1. At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of mass pG have successful
projects and the rest have failed projects. After repaying their liabilities, entrepreneurs
of mass pi ∈ (0, 1) get a signal of survival and the rest have to die.
Entrepreneurs who have successful projects and receive the signal of death are of mass
pG(1−pi). They repay their liabilities, sell off their assets, consume all proceeds, and exit
from the economy. Entrepreneurs who have failed projects and receive the signal of death
are of mass (1 − pG)(1 − pi). They hand over their land stock to the mutual funds and
exit from the economy without consumption.
The newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs are endowed with a unit of labor. As
the expected rate of return on their net worth exceeds their time preference rate, they
supply their labor endowment inelastically let = 1 to the domestic production of final
goods and their wage income is wet . At the end of period t, the entrepreneur maximizes
his expected utility function, subject to his credit constraints specified in equation (6)
and period-budget constraints as follows,
(qt + a)k
e
t = nt + z
e
t , where nt ≡ Nt − cet , (7)
Nt denotes his end-of-period wealth. The newcomers and entrepreneurs who have failed
projects and survive to the next period are of mass (1 − pi) + (1 − pG)pi and their end-
of-period wealth is Nt = wet ; entrepreneurs who have successful projects and survive to
the next period are of mass pGpi and their end-of-period wealth is Nt = wet + (Rvt +
qt −Rmt−1 − τ)ket−1. As the marginal rate of return on project “Good” exceeds their time
preference rate, entrepreneurs put all end-of-period wealth into their project, borrow to
the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death. In the aggregate, per capita
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consumption and net worth of entrepreneurs are
cet = (1− pi)pG(Rvt + qt −Rmt−1 − τ)ket−1, (8)
nt = pip
G(Rvt + qt −Rmt−1 − τ)ket−1 + wet . (9)
In the steady state, per capita consumption of entrepreneurs is linear in their land stock,
ce = (1 − pi)pGb˜ke. As mentioned above, the wealth tax reduces the external value of
project “Good”. Thus, the entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity declines in the wealth tax
and so does their land stock, ke. Therefore, the wealth tax has an indirect negative effect
on the entrepreneurs’ consumption and net worth.
2.4 Mutual Funds
The mutual funds finance their aggregate lending to domestic agents,
Zt = z
h
t + z
e
t =
Et[qt+1K + p
G(Rvt+1 − b˜− τ)ket ]
rt
, (10)
in period t using foreign deposits z∗t = θtZt and domestic deposits dt = (1− θt)Zt. At the
beginning of period t + 1, the total repayment from successful entrepreneurs is pGRmt k
e
t ;
failed entrepreneurs hand over their total land stock (1−pG)ket to the mutual funds. With
the safe project, households repay their liabilities rtz
h
t as promised. The profit or loss of
the mutual funds is affected by capital gains or losses on the land of failed entrepreneurs,
Πt+1 = [p
GRmt + (1− pG)qt+1]ket + rtzht − rdt dt − r∗z∗t = (1− pG)(qt+1 − Etqt+1)ket .
As shown in section 4, capital account liberalization results in an unexpected rise in the
price of land in the period of announcement, qt > Et−1qt and households get a positive
lump-sum profit transfer from the mutual funds in the period of policy announcement.
According to our calibration, 1 − pG = 0.01, the transfer is tiny and does not affect our
results very much.
2.5 Final Goods Production and Balance of Payment
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor,
Yt = M
α
t L
(1−α−α′)
t (L
e
t )
α′ , (11)
where Mt, Lt, and L
e
t denote aggregate inputs of intermediate goods and labor of house-
holds and entrepreneurs. Inputs are priced at their respective marginal products,
vtMt = αYt, (12)
wtLt = (1− α− α′)Yt, (13)
wetL
e
t = α
′Yt, (14)
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As shown in subsection 2.3, the entrepreneurs’ loan and project investment are propor-
tional to their respective net worth. The assumption of the labor incomes of entrepreneurs
is necessary because it ensures that each entrepreneur always has a positive level of net
worth. In the meantime, we set α′ very small and thus, the entrepreneurs’ wage income
is tiny. Therefore, the dynamics of their net worth is not driven by the wage income.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) take the same approach.
The net exports covers the net interest payment to foreign lenders,
NXt = r
∗z∗t−1 − z∗t . (15)
The public regulator transfers all tax revenues from entrepreneurs to households,
Λt = p
Gτket .
Assumption 1. lims→∞Et(βsqt+s) = 0.
Assumption 1 helps rule out explosive land price bubbles and the economy converges
to its steady state along a locally unique equilibrium path after a small policy shock.
2.6 Market Equilibrium
The markets of land, intermediate goods, final goods, and credit clear,
K = kt + k
e
t , (16)
Mt = H(kt−1) + pGRket−1, (17)
Yt = ct + c
e
t + ak
e
t +NXt, (18)
z∗t = θZt, (19)
dt = (1− θ)Zt. (20)
Definition 1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {kt, lt, ct, dt}, en-
trepreneurs, {ket , nt, zet , cet}, and aggregate variables {Mt, Yt, NXt, Zt, z∗t }, together with a
set of prices
{vt, qt, wt, wet , rt, rdt , Rmt }, satisfying equations (1)-(20), given the exogenous processes of
the policy parameter {θt}.
For the welfare analysis, we define the welfare of households and entrepreneurs by
their respective conditional life-time utility,
Vt = log(ct) + χ
(L¯− lt)1−ψ − 1
1− ψ + βEtVt+1, (21)
V et = c
e
t + βEtV
e
t+1. (22)
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2.7 Calibration
As our paper intends to provide a conceptual framework to think about the efficiency and
welfare implications of capital account liberalization, we focus here more on its qualitative
results instead of its quantitative relevance. As an analytical solution is not obtainable,
we use a numerical example to show the intuition explicitly. We calibrate the model to
fulfill certain steady-state conditions under international financial autarky (θ = 0).
The aggregate land stock is normalized at unity, K¯ = 1. The household project is
decreasing-return-to-scale, H(kt) =

1+λ
[
1− (1− kt)1+λ
]
and H ′(kt) = (1− kt)λ, where
λ = 8. We set β = 0.97 implying that the domestic deposit rate are 12% per annum. The
foreign interest rate is set at 1 ≤ r∗ < 1
β
. For the case of the fixed household labor supply,
we set χ = 0 and L¯ = 1 so that households supply all their labor endowment, l = L¯;
for the case of the endogenous household labor supply, we set L¯ = 3 and χ is calibrated
to make l = L¯
3
for ψ ∈ {0, 1, 5}, respectively. In both cases, households have the same
labor supply, l = 1, and the economy has the same steady state. We set α = 0.36 and
α′ = 0.00001 so that the household wage income accounts for nearly 64% of aggregate
output of final goods and the entrepreneur wage income is tiny.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we set pG = 0.99, implying a quarterly failure
rate at 1 percent. We also normalize the land price at unity. The rest of parameters are
set as {pi = 2
3
, R = 64, a = 1.29,  = 10, b˜ = 1.74} so that entrepreneurs finance half of the
their project investments using own funds (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999), and
project “Good” is expected to be always more productive than the household project.
3 Long-Run Efficiency and Welfare Implications
We analyze here how capital controls affect production efficiency and social welfare in the
long run. By assuming that households do not care about leisure, χ = 0, we identify the
pure asset allocation effects of capital controls in subsection 3.1. We then show in section
3.2 how endogenous labor supply of households reinforces the efficiency gains from capital
account liberalization.
3.1 Capital Controls and Asset Allocation
Figure 2 shows how capital controls affect some endogenous variables, given the gross
foreign interest rate r∗ = {1, 1.001, 1.01}, respectively. The steady state values of endoge-
nous variables X = X(θ, τ) are functions of two policy parameters: the degree of capital
controls and the wealth tax rate. We first consider the case without the wealth tax on en-
trepreneurs, τ = 0. HH and EN are abbreviations for households and entrepreneurs. The
horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ (0, 1), and the vertical axes show the percentage difference of
the relevant variables under different degrees of capital controls in comparison with the
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case of international financial autarky, xˆ =
[
X(θ∈(0,1),τ=0)−X(θ=0,τ=0)
X(θ=0,τ=0)
]
100. Given χ = 0,
households supply all their labor endowment, l = L¯ = 1, to the final goods production.
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Figure 2: The Long-Run Welfare Effects of Capital Account Liberalization
Aggregate lending of the mutual funds, Z = d+ z∗, consists of the deposits of house-
holds and foreign lenders. According to equation (3), the rate of return on household
deposits, rd = 1
β
, is independent of θ. The rise in θ results in the substitution of cheap
foreign funds for domestic deposits. As a weighted sum of the foreign and domestic de-
posit rates, the loan rate declines in θ from rd = 1
β
to r∗. In the extreme case of θ = 1,
domestic loans are financed by foreign deposits only and the domestic loan rate coincides
with the foreign deposit rate, r = r∗.
Although domestic agents cannot directly borrow abroad, capital account liberaliza-
tion results in the decline in the loan rate and domestic agents can acquire more loans
and invest more land in their projects. Given the fixed aggregate land stock, the rise in
the land demand pushes up the land price. Given our calibration, the external value per
unit of land invested in the entrepreneurs’ project is larger than that in the household
project which is the land price itself. Thus, a rise in θ results in the land reallocation
towards entrepreneurs and aggregate production becomes more efficient.
According to equations (5) and (8), the entrepreneurs’ consumption in steady state
is proportional to their land stock, ce = pG(1 − pi)b˜ke. The increase in their land stock
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makes entrepreneurs benefit strictly from capital account liberalization in the long run.
Given that the marginal product of project “Good” exceeds that of the household
project, asset reallocation towards entrepreneurs increases aggregate output of intermedi-
ate goods. As final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor in the Cobb-
Douglas fashion, the rise in aggregate input of intermediate goods raises the household
wage rate.
Therefore, the rise in θ has one direct effect and two indirect effects on household
wealth. First, the return on household deposits rdd = (1−θ)Z
β
declines in θ; second, due
to the unfavorable asset reallocation, the sales revenues of households decline; third, the
rise in the wage rate increases the household wage income. The first two effects are
negative and the last is positive. The life-time utility of households depends only on their
consumption. Whether households benefit from capital account liberalization in the long
run depends on the relative magnitude of these three effects. Here, the size of the foreign
interest rate plays an important role.
Consider an extreme case in which the net foreign interest rate is zero, r∗ = 1. See the
first row of figure 2. The rise in θ from 0 to 1 makes the loan rate decline from 1
β
to 1. Such
a dramatic decline in the loan rate facilitates asset reallocation and the entrepreneurs’
land stock rises by 0.4%. At the same time, according to equation (4), the steady state
value of the land price is negatively related to the loan rate. Aggregate loans are partially
backed by the value of aggregate land stock, Z = qK+p
G(Rv−b˜)ke
r
. Although the rise in θ
reduces the relative weight of household deposits over total deposits, the dramatic increase
in the land price partially offsets it. In all, the absolute value of household deposits does
not decline so much. Altogether, the positive wage effect is large enough to dominate the
two negative effects. Thus, capital account liberalization has the overall positive wealth
effect on households and their consumption rises in this case.
Consider the case of r∗ = 1.01 which implies a foreign interest rate at 4% per annum.
See the third row of figure 2. As θ rises from 0 to 1, the loan rate declines in a smaller
magnitude than that in the case of r∗ = 1. The improvement in production efficiency is
smaller and so is the rise in the wage rate. At the same time, the rise in the land price is
smaller and the decline in the absolute value of household deposits is larger. Altogether,
the positive wage effect is dominated by the negative deposit effects and the households’
consumption declines in θ. This result is robust even for a smaller net foreign interest
rate, e.g., r∗ = 1.0001. See the second row of figure 2.
The fact that households may lose in the long run can be understood intuitively as
follows. As shown in figure 2, the efficiency gains are smaller if the foreign interest rate
is higher. At the same time, by lending to mutual funds, the foreign lenders are entitled
with a fraction of domestic output in the form of the interest payment. Thus, if the
foreign interest rate is higher, it is more possible that the efficiency gains are dominated
by the interest payment to foreign lenders. In other words, final goods available for the
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consumption of domestic agents may decline in θ, given a high foreign interest rate. As
the entrepreneurs’ consumption is proportional to their land stock, entrepreneurs always
benefit from the improvement in production efficiency. As a result, the consumption of
households declines in θ. Here, the size of the pie and the distribution of the pie are two
different issues. In other words, households lose strictly in the long run.
Given that capital account liberalization may have opposite long-run welfare impli-
cations to agents with different productivity, a relevant policy question may be whether
public transfers from entrepreneurs to household can make both groups of agents better off
than under international financial autarky. Figure 3 shows how the wealth tax affects the
consumption of households and entrepreneurs, given θ = 0.99. The horizontal axes denote
τ ∈ (0, 0.005) and we scale it up by 103 for visuality. The vertical axes denote the percent-
age difference of relevant variables under different tax rates, in comparison with the case
of international financial autarky without the wealth tax, xˆ =
[
X(θ=0.99,τ)−X(θ=0,τ=0)
X(θ=0,τ=0)
]
100.
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Figure 3: The Welfare Effects of Public Transfer: θ = 0.99
According to equation (5), entrepreneurs must be rewarded for choosing project “Good”
and their expected reward per unit of land invested, pGb˜, is independent of the wealth
tax. The wealth tax reduces the expected after-tax external value per unit of land in-
vested in project “Good” and has the negative effect on the entrepreneurs’ borrowing
and investment. Thus, the wealth tax reduces the efficiency gains from capital account
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liberalization. As a result, entrepreneurs lose strictly from the wealth tax and households
benefit. However, the question is whether public transfers can fully compensate the loss
of households in comparison with the case of international financial autarky, given that
entrepreneurs are made no worse off than under international financial autarky. Figure 3
shows that even for a very small net foreign interest rate, e.g., r∗ = 1.0001, the household
consumption is still below its level under international financial autarky.
Intuitively, aggregate output of final goods is distributed among entrepreneurs, house-
holds, and foreign lenders. If public transfers make entrepreneurs just as well off as under
international financial autarky, it implies that the entrepreneurs’ land stock is exactly the
same as under international financial autarky and so is aggregate output of final goods.
Given a positive net interest payment to foreign lenders, the household consumption must
be strictly smaller than under international financial autarky. In this sense, public transfer
cannot fully compensate the loss of households if the net foreign interest rate is positive.
3.2 Endogenous Labor Supply and Efficiency Gains
Figure 4 compares the welfare effects of capital account liberalization in the cases of
endogenous household labor supply (solid lines) and fixed household labor supply (dashed
lines), given zero wealth tax on entrepreneurs, τ = 0. The horizontal and vertical axes
have the same meaning as those of figure 2. For the case of endogenous household labor
supply, we first assume that households have linear preference on leisure, ψ = 0. We also
set χ = 0.98 so that the household labor supply is l = 1 under international financial
autarky, given their labor endowment L¯ = 3. Thus, the steady states of the two cases are
same under international financial autarky.
As shown in subsection 3.1, capital account liberalization reduces the loan rate and
improves production efficiency. The increase in aggregate output of intermediate goods
pushes up the wage rate. If households do not care about leisure χ = 0, they supply all
their labor endowment to the final goods production. Although capital account liberal-
ization has negative effects on their wealth, households cannot further increase their labor
supply. However, if households care about leisure, e.g., χ = 0.98 and ψ = 0, they can
adjust their labor supply to the change in the wage rate. Capital account liberalization
has a positive wage effect and a negative wealth effect on households. Thus, households
increase their labor supply and it may fully offset the negative wealth effects. In the
cases of r∗ ∈ {1.0001, 1.001, 1.01}, household consumption is strictly higher than under
international financial autarky.
The increase in the household labor supply directly pushes up aggregate output of
final goods. At the same time, it raises the price of intermediate goods. Thus, the
external value of project “Good” increases and entrepreneurs can borrow and invest more.
Land is allocated to entrepreneurs in a larger magnitude than in the case of the fixed
household labor supply, χ = 0. In this sense, the endogenous household labor supply
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Figure 4: Fixed vs Endogenous Household Labor Supply
has an indirect efficiency effect. In comparison with the case of the fixed household labor
supply, entrepreneurs benefit more from capital account liberalization.
Frisch elasticity is defined as the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to wage,
holding consumption constant, (Frisch, 1959). It is L¯−l
ψ
> 0 in our model. A larger ψ
implies that households are less willing to increase their labor supply for a rise in the
wage rate. Labor market institutions may affect Frisch elasticity. It may be smaller in
countries with more sophisticated unemployment insurance and stronger labor union. For
simplicity, we do not explicitly model labor market institutions but use ψ as a short cut
to capture the labor market rigidity.8
Figure 5 compares the effects of capital account liberalization under different Frisch
elasticities. The horizontal and vertical axes have the same meaning as those of figure 2.
Agg and FG are abbreviations for aggregate and final goods, respectively. We consider
three cases, ψ = {0, 1, 5}, and set χ = {0.98, 1.96, 31} accordingly to keep the household
labor supply the same in all three cases under international financial autarky, l = L¯
3
= 1,
given their labor endowment L¯ = 3.
In the case of relatively inelastic labor supply, e.g., ψ = 5 (dotted lines), the positive
8As commonly criticized, the variation of aggregate labor supply is more related with the quantity of
workers employed instead of the working hours of individual employees.
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Figure 5: The Flexibility of Household Labor Supply and Efficiency Gains
wage effect from capital account liberalization induces households to increase their labor
supply in a smaller magnitude than in the case of more elastic labor supply, e.g., ψ = 0.
The indirect efficiency gains via the household labor supply channel is smaller. The
smaller increase in the entrepreneurs’ land stock implies that entrepreneurs benefit from
capital account liberalization in a smaller magnitude than in the case of ψ = 0. At the
same time, the increase in the wage income cannot fully offset the negative wealth effects
and households have to reduce their consumption.
In this sense, the efficiency gains from capital account liberalization can be affected by
the flexibility of labor market. If the government intends to improve production efficiency,
capital account liberalization should be accompanied with reforms increasing labor mar-
ket flexibility. However, without explicitly modeling the labor market institutions and
unemployment, we cannot conduct the welfare analysis on such reforms.
Although the household consumption rises in θ in the case of ψ = 0, the rise in their
labor supply has a negative effect on household welfare, as shown in figure 5. Overall,
capital account liberalization has negative long-run welfare implications to households.
This result also holds in the other two cases. It seems that households lose more in the
case of more flexible labor market. As the household preference differs in the three cases,
changes in the household welfare are not comparable.
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4 Cold-Turkey or Gradualism?
This section discusses how the two implementation approaches, i.e., the cold-turkey ap-
proach and the gradualism approach, can result in macroeconomic fluctuations as well as
their welfare implications in the short run. Endogenous variables are approximated as
the linear functions of state variables in logarithms around the old steady state9, which
we solve using the MATLAB codes provided by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). In or-
der to explicitly show aggregate fluctuations resulting from endogenous asset reallocation
only, we set χ = 0 so as to exclude the effect of changes in household labor supply. In
this case, households supply all of their labor endowment to the final goods production
l = L¯ = 1. We exclude the wealth tax on entrepreneurs (τ = 0). Figure 6 shows the
impulse responses of the model economy with respect to the cold-turkey approach (dash-
dotted lines) and the gradualism approach (solid lines) with which the public regulator
raises θ permanently from 50% to 55%.
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Figure 6: Cold-Turkey Approach vs. Gradualism Approach
Consider the cold-turkey approach first. See the dash-dotted lines. The public regu-
9Section 3 shows that capital account liberalization in the form of a permanent change in θ changes the
steady state of the economy. Thus, the dynamic analysis based on the log-linearization at the old steady
state could be inaccurate. However, for a small change in θ, we can still use first-order approximations
to analyze the transitional dynamics from the old steady state to the new steady state.
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lator announces in period 0 that θ will be raised permanently from 50% to 55% in period
1. Anticipating a higher land price in the future, households and entrepreneurs increase
their demand for land and thus, the land price rises in period 0. Capital gains on the
entrepreneurs’ land stock improve entrepreneurial net worth and entrepreneurs increase
their loans and land stock. The demand effect dominates at the credit market in the sense
that the loan rate increases dramatically in period 0. As θ is still unchanged in period 0,
the rise in the loan rate also pushes up the deposit rate. Proportional to domestic loans,
foreign deposits rise slightly.
Capital gains also have positive wealth effects on households. The dramatic rise in
the deposit rate induces households to reduce consumption and increase deposits. Given
that aggregate output of intermediate goods is predetermined by the project investment
of households and entrepreneurs in the previous period, aggregate output of final goods
is unchanged in period 0.
Due to the period-0 reallocation of land in favor of entrepreneurs, aggregate output of
intermediate goods rises in period 1. Given the fixed household labor supply, aggregate
output of final goods rises in period 1, too. Proportional to aggregate output of final
goods, the household wage income also rises in period 1.
The dramatic increase in θ in period 1 leads to a huge capital inflow and the supply
effect dominates at the credit market in the sense that the loan rate falls. Thus, en-
trepreneurs can borrow more and demand more land. As a result, the land price rises
by 7.6%, larger than the 5.1% in the new steady state. The fact that the period-1 re-
sponse of the land price exceed its new steady state level is similar as the exchange rate
overshooting shown by Dornbusch (1976). However, the overshooting here results from
financial frictions instead of price rigidity.
Due to the favorable deposit rate in period 0, the deposit return is large in period
1. The increase in the wage income also has a positive wealth effect on households. As
mutual funds substitute cheap foreign funds for household deposits, the deposit rate has
to fall. The positive wealth effect and the decline in the deposit rate induce households to
increase consumption and reduce deposits. As θ is constant at its new level from period
1 on, the economy reaches its new steady state quickly.
Figure 2 shows that entrepreneurs benefit from capital account liberalization in the
long run due to the favorable asset reallocation. In the short run, the entrepreneurs’ land
stock is strictly above the old steady state level and so is their conditional life-time utility.
See the panel titled “EN Welfare”. Therefore, entrepreneurs benefit strictly from capital
account liberalization in the long run and in the short run.
Figure 2 shows that a rise in θ reduces household consumption in the long run. In
other words, households lose strictly in the long run. However, their conditional life-time
utility actually increases in the first two periods. See the panel titled “HH Welfare”.
Intuitively, capital gains on the households’ land stock have positive wealth effects in
23
period 0. In period 1, mutual funds substitute cheap foreign funds for household de-
posits. The substituted household deposits actually finance the extra consumption of
households. Therefore, households benefit from capital account liberalization in the short
run, although they lose in the long run.
Consider now the gradualism approach. See the solid lines. The public regulator
announces a policy path of θt in period 0. Different from the cold-turkey approach,
θ gradually reaches the new level from period 1 on. Thus, the period-1 inflow of cheap
foreign funds increase only slightly and the decline in the loan rate is also small. Compared
to the case of the cold-turkey approach, entrepreneurs increase their demand for loans and
land also in a smaller magnitude. The land price does not overshoot in the sense that it
rises only by 4.2% in period 1, less than the 5.1% in the new steady state.
Anticipating a smaller increase in the land price in period 1, entrepreneurs can borrow
only a smaller amount and the increase in their land demand is smaller in period 0. As a
result, the land price does not increase as much as in the case of the cold-turkey approach
in period 0. On the one hand, the smaller capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth
less dramatically and the increase in the loan demand of entrepreneurs is smaller, too.
The loan rate rises in a smaller magnitude and so is the deposit rate. On the other hand,
the smaller capital gains have smaller wealth effects on households. Due to consumption-
smoothing motive, the rise in the deposit rate induces households to reduce consumption
in a larger magnitude.
As θ is unchanged in period 0, foreign loans do not increase much. From period 1 on,
θ rises gradually to the new steady state level. The loan rate and the deposit rate fall
below the old steady state value in period 1. The period-1 wealth effects due to the return
on deposits made in period 0 is smaller than in the case of the cold-turkey approach and
so is the increase in the household period-1 consumption. The rise in the entrepreneurs’
land stock in period 0 results in the increase in aggregate output of intermediate goods in
period 1 and aggregate output of final goods rises, too. From period 1 on, θ rises gradually
to the new level and the domestic economy also reaches its new steady state gradually.
Output, investment, consumption, loans, the interest rates, and the land price re-
spond in a much smaller magnitude to the gradualism approach than to the cold-turkey
approach. In this sense, the gradualism approach helps achieve a smoother transition.
Compared to the case of the cold-turkey approach, the land price responds less strongly.
The wealth effects resulting from capital gains are also smaller. It explains the fact that
the responses of conditional welfare of households and entrepreneurs are smaller in the
period of policy announcement. The conditional welfare of entrepreneurs is always below
that in the case of the cold-turkey approach, while the conditional welfare of households
is above that since period 2. Therefore, entrepreneurs strictly prefer the cold-turkey
approach and households may prefer the gradualism approach.
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5 Final Remarks
This paper provides a theoretical model to consider the efficiency and welfare implications
of capital account liberalization. We show that financial opening facilitates the inflows
of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency. However, capital account
liberalization also has important distributional consequences. Specifically, endogenous
asset reallocation has opposite welfare implications to agents with different productivity
and it may be impossible to use public transfers to compensate the loss of those negatively
affected by capital account liberalization.
Efficiency gains from capital account liberalization are larger in countries with more
flexible labor market. From the efficiency perspective, capital account liberalization
should be accompanied with reforms increasing labor market flexibility.
Due to financial frictions, asset prices overshoot if capital controls are lifted hastily.
Asset price booms lead to lending boom and then large amounts of non-performing loans if
the financial system is underdeveloped which is not modeled here. Thus, from a practical
perspective, capital account should be liberalized gradually for a smooth transition.
Efficiency gains from capital account liberalization are quantitatively small in our
model. It results from some of our assumptions. First, it is the interest rate differential
that drives capital inflows in our model economy and foreign lenders do not actively
participate in the domestic credit market. Suppose that foreign lenders can actively
monitor the projects of entrepreneurs. The information problems are further mitigated
and entrepreneurs can credibly choose more productive projects. Thus, efficiency gains
can be larger.
Second, In order to distinguish the asset reallocation effect from the growth effect
of capital account liberalization, we do not consider economic growth. If we introduce
economic growth, the improvement in production efficiency can be more significant.
In the present model without economic growth, capital account liberalization is desir-
able from the efficiency perspective but not from the welfare perspective because house-
holds are worse off. If we introduce economic growth, the positive wage effect may dom-
inate the negative crowding-out effect of domestic deposits. Households may benefit
strictly. We may calculate the threshold value of growth rate above which capital account
liberalization is desirable from the perspectives of both efficiency and welfare.
The current literature argues that capital account liberalization may promote eco-
nomic growth via the improvement in allocation, e.g., Henry (2003). However, empiri-
cal evidences are rather mixed: Quinn (1997) reports a positive correlation between the
change in his capital account openness indicator and growth, while Rodrik (1998) finds no
association between capital account openness and growth and questions whether capital
flows favor economic development.
If the threshold value of economic growth mentioned above exists, we may reconsider
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the relationship between capital account liberalization and economic growth, i.e., the
causality may run from economic growth to capital account liberalization. The logic is
as follows. In the economy with a high growth rate, it is easier to lift capital controls
because it makes everyone better off. In fact, some East Asian economies did liberalize
their capital account during the period of high economic growth, e.g., South Korea, Thai-
land, and Taiwan in 1980s and 1990s. According to Bakker and Chapple (2002), capital
account liberalization often coincided with a period of strong economic growth, boosted
by the increased availability of credit. In this sense, a decent growth rate is one of the
necessary conditions for capital account liberalization. Furthermore, it also implies that
the government should focus more on promoting economic growth instead of using public
transfers to compensate those negatively affected.
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